On the Gilded Age Robber Barons…And the Debate I LOST!
I heroically took the PRO side in a debate against my brilliant students on the resolution:
The so-called “Robber Barons” were malevolent crooks who bilked the American public to get rich.
Well, that did not go well–and I lost!
Hear it all here.
4 Responses
Fun debate—I wish my kids could have you as a teacher!
At about 31:30, I’m not sure I understand your reasoning about “slack.” The audio was choppy, but it sounded like you said if you pay your workers too much, it incentivizes them to work less and to find a different job. I don’t get the reasoning.
No, you’re quite right. I did not mean slack in the technical sense of resources not used.
However, there is a form of slack–or unintended lack of productivity–should a laborer be overcompensated and thus moved toward other pursuits besides the functions for which he was intitally hired or that most suit the employer.
As to what the term is for that, I am at a loss. Should you know it or could direct me to a source about that, sharing such would be greatly appreciated.
Sorry, I’m the last person you should ask for economics terms. 🙂
I’m still having trouble wrapping my head around the idea you’re trying to get across. If a low-skill worker starts getting overcompensated, how would that incentivize him to pursue a different job? Maybe if you could give me an example, I could see it more clearly.
Great. Let me try to explain with a thought experiment, one dependent upon the law of marginal utility.
Let’s say that a moving company hires a driver. That company invests in the driver even before he begins work in terms of background checks, time spent in interviews, on-boarding, etc. Then, the company invests further in terms of training, licensing, bonding, etc.
In our scenario then, the driver goes on any number of jobs wherein he gets over-compensated (relative to market price per move and even his own expectations). He thus might be incentivized to take a vacation with the access money, take one or several less jobs due to the fact that his income status has changed thus too his subjective calculus pertaining to marginal utility. He might even–at anytime to the detriment of the employer–simply up and quit, preferring another job (of even lesser pay), retirement, etc.
The same scenario could play out for an Uber driver, a housing contractor, a miner, and even salaried workers who might have an even more complicated range of incentives to pursue other jobs, careers, status, or credentials away from the presently held job.