"France's Last Chance: The French Third Republic
and the Establishment of the Moroccan Protectorate, 1900-1914."

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On the 24th of May 1912, General Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey, the recently appointed first resident-general of Morocco, entered the medieval capital of Fez in the Moroccan interior. He and his army of young Algerians and Frenchmen occupied the city quietly and the general went to meet with the Sultan, Moulay Hafid. Little did the general know that insurgents, under rebel leaders who had refused to recognize French authority over their homeland, were planning a massive attack on the old capital. That night, "the city was attacked by enormous rebel groups from the East, the South-East, and the North..."[1] For that week, the insurgents "penetrated the city and it was necessary to fight in the streets, foot by foot, house by house."[2] The French eventually repelled the invasion and secured the city on the 28th of May. It was then that Lyautey was given a letter, written by one of his fallen men: "stained with his blood," the letter was to be sent back home to France upon the young soldier's death. Clearly saddened by the death of the man, who had recently been married and become a father, Lyautey recorded it for posterity. Addressed to his wife, it read:

> I am seriously wounded, but I have no regrets; a shadow of melancholy comes to me, however, when I dream of you and our dear son. It should be told to him later that his father died

[1] Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey, "À sa soeur: le 26 mai, 1912," in Choix de lettres, 1882-1919 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1947), 287.
[2] Ibid.

for his country, and that my last thought was of you both.[3]

Uprisings, chaos, and dead French soldiers did not comprise the sort of welcome that Lyautey had hoped for upon his arrival in the new protectorate. Although the French emerged successful in their attempt to hold Fez, the cost of the victory was substantial. Ten officers were killed or wounded, sixty men were killed, and 150 others were wounded in their defense of the city.[4] The attack on Fez represented only one of the many incidents of widespread fighting between the French forces attempting to "pacify" the Moroccan interior and Moroccan rebels intent on menacing the French. The rebellious Islamic caliphs and local leaders were determined not to allow the French to occupy the countryside as they had the coastal enclaves years before. Sustained fighting characterized the first several months of the Lyautey residency. The perilous military situation led the normally upbeat and optimistic Lyautey to admit in a letter to his sister that Morocco, "is not a sinecure, nor an enviable post that I have found; what malaise and what risks!"[5]

French blood was not all that the Third Republic government in Paris was willing to give up in order to add Morocco to the French imperial fold. In the end, the protectorate in Morocco would not only force France to deploy tens of thousands of men, but dole out billions of francs in material and economic aid as well. As a result of the substantial sacrifices that the Third Republic gave in order to have Morocco, one must ask: why were the French even there?

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[3] Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey, "À l'École des Sciences Politiques, le 21 décembre, 1912," in Paroles d'Action: Madagascar, Sud-Oranais, Oran, Maroc, 1900-1926 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1927), 81.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Lyautey, "À sa soeur," in Choix, 288.

Historians who have dealt with France's seemingly innate interest in Morocco have rightfully identified two reasons why the Third Republic was so enamored with Morocco. First, Morocco was strategically important to France. Located on the southern side of the Straits of Gibraltar, the French could effectively cripple German power in the Mediterranean should war erupt in Europe. Moreover, to the French, Morocco represented a sort of consolation prize for France's participation in the Franco-Prussian War. The Third Republic could do nothing to regain Alsace-Lorraine, but obtaining control over Morocco might offset this strategic imbalance and assuage French *revanchist* sentiment.[6]

Secondly, Morocco provided vast economic opportunities for the Third Republic. Although not as rich in terms of natural resources as most sub-Saharan and Southeast Asian French colonies, Morocco did possess substantial mining areas, especially in the South. But, because of Morocco's proximity to the metropole, Morocco represented a desirable new market for French goods. In point of fact, the French were so interested in rendering Morocco economically viable (*mise en valeur*), that only two months before the signing of the Treaty of Fez, a group of notables and businessmen were commissioned to go to Morocco and outline a program on how to best develop the interior of the country. The Mission of Economic Studies of Morocco (la Mission d'Études Économiques au Maroc) studied everything from how to improve farming methods and the maintenance of livestock, to how much money was needed to adequately modernize Moroccan ports.[7] The fact that the members of the Mission carried out their

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[6] Edouard Moha, Histoire des Relations Franco-Marocaines (Paris: Picollecc, 1995), 61-64.
[7] Comité du Maroc, "Séance du 10 juillet 1912, Présedence de M. Eugène Étienne: La mission d'études économiques au Maroc," Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française et du Comité du Maroc, no. 7, (juillet 1912): 252-267.

duties in the middle of a virtual war zone is evidence of how concerned the French were in profiting from their new protectorate.

There is no doubt that both strategic and economic concerns fed France's insatiable drive for greater dominance over Morocco, and many French initiatives throughout the history of the Lyautey residency were pursued with such goals in mind. For instance, the protectorate benefited France strategically by providing the metropole with Moroccan troops who fought extensively in France from the onset of World War I. Also, other economic missions and advisors visited Morocco repeatedly in order to find new avenues for further French economic usurpation of the protectorate. The ports at Casablanca, Rabat, and Agadir were enlarged and improved, facilitating the sale of French goods throughout Morocco. However, one aspect of the French experience in the early history of the protectorate that has remained under-examined is the socio-political dimension of French imperialism in Morocco.

In the history of French imperialism, an institution that spanned four centuries, Morocco occupied a unique chronological position. Morocco was the last African nation to be added to the French fold. Moreover, the protectorate was founded after decades of intense debate among French intellectuals over imperial methods and philosophies, as well as France's colonial mission. Adding to Morocco's exceptionality within the French *monde coloniale* was the fact the Third Republic had just emerged from tumultuous political and social events that had rocked the metropole. Throughout the two decades that proceeded the signing of the Treaty of Fez, France was embroiled by the infamous Dreyfus Affair and the separation of church and state laws, ratified in 1905. The Third Republic government that emerged from these struggles looked very different in

comparison to past regimes in which Catholics, monarchists, Bonapartists, and other conservatives represented a significant bloc in the National Assembly. Anti-liberal, anti-republican forces had supported the army throughout the Dreyfus Affair, and thus were discredited when it became obvious that the army had framed the captain. The result was a legislature that was almost exclusively republican, and one that had radical, anti-clerical tendencies. It was the initiatives of this Third Republic and the triumph of new colonial philosophies that defined French policy in Morocco. In short, Morocco was the site of a new form of French imperialism.

The shape of this new French imperialism was not solely defined by Lyautey himself, as other authors have eloquently but erroneously claimed. For example, Hervé Bleuchot has written that "Lyautey went and empowered himself to give meaning to the word protectorate."[8] The distinguished historian of the protectorate era, Daniel Rivet, has rightly identified that many historians like Bleuchot have given far as too much recognition to Lyautey concerning the protectorate's policies. He sarcastically remarks that analyses that declare, "Lyautey, that is Morocco. Morocco, that is Lyautey," perilously remove the nation itself from involvement in its own protectorate.[9] Lyautey contributed, but did not act as sole creator of the sort of imperialism that was to be employed in Morocco. In other words, Lyautey did not establish the protectorate in a vacuum, isolated from the events, tendencies, movements and structures associated with France and her empire. On the contrary, developments in both the metropole and the empire at large profoundly impacted the formation of the protectorate policy applied in

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[8] Hervé Bleuchot, Les liberaux français au Maroc, 1947-1955 (Aix-en-Provençe: Éditions de l'Université de Provençe, 1973), 17.

[9] Daniel Rivet, Le Maroc de Lyautey à Mohammed V: le double visage du Protectorat (Paris: Denoël, 1999), 19.

Morocco. I argue that as a cause of the Dreyfus Affair, the French secular state emerged triumphant and intent on instilling secular ideas, not only within France proper, but within their new protectorate as well. However, this inherent desire to establish a secular state in Morocco was tempered ultimately by France's new imperial approach. The French had abandoned efforts to create new Frenchmen; instead they hoped to inject an imperialism that was seemingly more respectful of indigenous cultures and institutions. The combination of secularism and associationism, as the new imperial approach was to be called, produced a volatile and unnatural administrative concoction in Morocco, but also a seemingly more enlightened imperialism that the French were desperate to employ. That is why the French were so willing to sacrifice their men, invest enormous sums of money, and even risk war with Germany in order to obtain Morocco, for it represented the last opportunity in which the Third Republic hoped to reconcile itself with France's imperial mission.

**From Assimilationism to Associationism:**

First, let us examine the intellectual debate concerning France's responsibilities as a colonial power and the emergence of the new imperial ideology that was to be applied to Morocco. Until about 1895, the philosophy that dominated French imperial thought and action was a convulsive mixture of Ancien Régime notions of empire and the concept that indigenous people were capable of assimilating into French society. That is to say that, prior to 1789, French missionaries, settlers, and administrators did not concern themselves with turning natives, who they viewed as being wholly uncivilized and

backward, into Frenchmen. On the other hand, because of the absence of civilized authority, Ancien Régime imperialists subscribed to the idea that France should govern directly over colonial areas that existed outside of the realm of civilization. They never fully endorsed the idea that the people they encountered could become equal to them--equal as Frenchmen. The Revolution, as Rogers Brubaker has so aptly pointed out, radically altered the accepted construction of the French citizen, and therefore the requirements of being French.[10] After 1789, the theory and practice of assimilating native peoples began to be seen as compatible with the message of the Revolution and the ideas of what it meant to actually be French. Jean Lambert Tallien's classic quote, in 1795, that "the only foreigners in France are the bad citizens," adequately sums up the view of the revolutionaries on the subject of who could and could not be French.[11] The French, unlike the Germans, whose citizenship to this day is largely based on ethnicity, believed that "being French" was based on one's mindset and the principles to which one adhered. Therefore, the Revolution opened the door for those not ethnically French to have the opportunity to "become French". Certainly, as the Revolution progressed, it became virulently nationalistic and ethnocentric. This turnabout was mainly a result of the revolutionary governments' frustration with their inability to inculcate the rest of Europe, and even minorities within France proper, with the ideals of 1789.[12] Nevertheless, the concept that "Frenchness" could be shared, lived on in post-Restoration imperialism. Civilization was available and, as bearer of Revolutionary light, France felt responsible to spread the doctrines of *liberté, égalité*, and *fraternité*.

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[10] Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 6-8.
[11] Ibid., 7.
[12] Ibid., 45-47.

The French West African colonies provide an excellent example of how French concepts of citizenship and nationality were applied *à l'outrè-mer*. In the coastal cities of Gorée, Saint-Louis, and Dakar, in which a portion of the population had assimilated into French culture, the inhabitants were considered to be full-fledged French citizens as early as 1833.[13] The French administered directly to the Four Communes of Gorée, Saint-Louis, Dakar, and Rufisique. Meanwhile, the statesmen in Paris and the colonial administrators in Dakar paid very little interest to the West African interior.[14] Indeed, they felt no need to: the fact was that the *assimilés* represented the greatest achievements of French colonialism in the eyes of French imperialists during most of the 19th century. They fulfilled the highest aspirations of French imperialism up to this point. The *assimilés* had renounced their "idolatrous" religion and "primitive" language, and in turn accepted French culture as their own.

However, this assimilationist imperialism had numerous problems. While assimilation produced an elite indigenous population loyal to France, it took decades and sometimes centuries to finally eradicate native social customs and institutions, and replace them with those of the French. Moreover, because it was believed that the colonial inhabitants could not effectively govern themselves, assimilation drained funds away from developing the colonies, and instead moneys were used to pay French administrators and military personnel to administer to the overseas holdings. Finally, only a small minority of the native population became truly assimilated, and the

[13] Alice Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997) 76-77.
[14] Ibid., 77-78.

preferences and economic incentives allotted to this minority caused vast social inequities and civil unrest.[15]

Looking for a better alternative, the government began to fund long colonial missions in which delegates would tour the empire and formulate new colonial strategies. One delegation in 1886 was ordered by the Freycinet government to tour "North Africa, India, and the Extreme Orient" for eighteen months.[16] Among the Frenchmen who toured the empire were two veterans of colonial affairs: Jean Marie de Lanessan and Jules Harmand. Both had been arguing for years for the reform of the imperial system and for the reassessment of France's colonial philosophies. Lanessan and Harmand reached the conclusion that the old colonial system, based on assimilation, was outdated and incredibly impractical. They favored the adoption of what would later be known as associationism. This new colonial ideology was grounded in the theories of Lanessan and Harmand. Under the doctrine of associationism, the French, as colonial overseers, would not attempt to eradicate the social, cultural, religious, and even political structures that characterized the native populations of the colonies.

In his extremely influential book, *La Colonisation Française de l'Indo-Chine*, Lanessan condemned French colonial practices.

> Despite the self-critique that they gladly make, the French are, in general, so convinced of the superiority of their laws and administrative rules that their primary concern is to introduce them everywhere they place their feet, and to impose them upon all the people onto which they wish to exercise their

[15] Phillip Boucher, "The Search for France's Colonial Past: The Historical Thought of French Imperialists, 1870-1914," French Colonial Studies, no. 2 (Lexington, Kentucky: French Colonial Historical Studies, 1978): 81-82.
[16] Pascal Venier, "Lyautey et l'Idée du Protectorat de 1894 à 1902: Genese d'une Doctrine Coloniale," Revue Française d'Histoire d'Outre-Mer 78 (1991): 501.

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Lanessan advocated the quick death of earlier 19th century French imperialism. In his mind, the Third Republic's obsession to dominate colonial peoples on every level—social, political, and cultural—was the cause of France's imperial ineffectiveness. Lanessan continually alluded to one particular example that highlighted the problems France faced as a result of their application of assimilationism. Ever since the French had occupied Indochina, colonial officers and administrators had struggled to firmly establish their colony in Tonkin. Lanessan attributed this resistance against the French by the Vietnamese and Laotians, not to a native rejection of French *mise en valeur* or to French attempts to inhabit Indochina, but to French insistence that purely French institutions be imposed there. Lanessan maintained that, instead of debasing the power of the Mandarins and shattering their indigenous institutions of administration, French administrators should work with local leaders.[18] Ideally, this would produce two desired results: one, the natives would not violently react to French presence if they believed that they still possessed even a semblance of power, and two, the number of French officials and officers needed to govern would decrease, allowing funds to be applied to infrastructure, education, and other programs to improve indigenous life.

Jules Harmand concurred with Lanessan's new imperial outlook: "It is only by associating our ambitions with their [the natives'] ambitions, past and future, that we will be able to claim the missionary role of a new civilization."[19] According to Harmand, it was absolutely irrational and extremely immoral for a government, which so closely

[17] Jean Marie de Lanessan, La Colonisation Française de l'Indo-Chine (Paris: F. Alcan, 1895), 52.
[18] Venier, 501.
[19] Jules Harmand, Domination et colonisation (Paris: Flammarion, 1919), 13.

espoused itself to the ideals of the Revolution, to go in and eradicate the colonies' indigenous cultures and completely subjugate colonial inhabitants. Rather, France needed to work with *les indigènes*, promote greater "financial and administrative autonomy"[20] for the colonies, and gain an appreciation for native culture.

Not surprisingly, the policy of associationism quickly gained support from Third Republic politicians who desired to tighten spending on the empire. Others had serious reservations about the ethicality of colonialism. Perhaps the most influential politician of the Third Republic, Georges Clemenceau, despised French colonialism and objected to France's intoxication with building the empire on several levels. Clemenceau believed that France did not have enough resources to devote to the colonies, nor could France "sacrifice her men at the four corners of the earth"[21] while the French position in Europe remained precarious. The Tiger maintained that France sent too many men and too many resources to the colonies; a practice that left the metropole increasingly vulnerable to German attack. Moreover, Clemenceau felt that the imperial mission often distracted the National Assembly from forming a cohesive, active domestic agenda. Right-wing opponents were responsible, he argued, for using colonialism in order to distract and stifle domestic reforms.[22] Finally, Clemenceau and many other radical leaders (especially the charismatic Socialist leader Jean Jaurès) felt that French colonial practices were inherently racist, and led to the dehumanization of the colonized. Clemenceau, as a result of the various atrocities committed against natives in Africa, believed that, "Africa decivilized the white man much more than the white man recivilized Africa."[23]

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[20] Boucher, 82.
[21] Pierre Guiral, Clemenceau en son temps, pref. Philippe Séguin, (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1994), 77.
[22] Ibid., 77-78.
[23] Ibid., 84.

It is easy to see then why many republicans in the National Assembly favored the introduction of associationism, a policy designed to not only save money, but one that pledged a greater degree of respect for indigenous culture. Associationism caught on so quickly in fact, that it was pronounced as the official colonial policy of the French Third Republic in 1895.[24] And while some statesmen from the left would continue to remain skeptical of the applicability of the new colonial doctrine, associationism was clearly more palatable than the policy of assimilation.

While the Third Republic was trying to reconcile itself with its own colonial mission, a young cavalry officer and graduate of Saint-Cyr, was marching his way through the ranks of the colonial officer corps. After a short stint in Algeria, where he witnessed the flaws of direct French administration, Hubert Louis Lyautey accepted a post in Tonkin. It was there that the martial prodigy read the works of Jean Marie Lanessan, Jules Harmand, and those of another notable reformer, Joseph Chailley-Bert. Lyautey became an instant follower.[25] Lyautey had long believed that assmiliationist practices had been the cause of French-native hostilities throughout the 19th century. Lanessan's work provided an articulation of the young officer's embryonic imperial philosophies.

One section of Lanessan's work in particular impacted Lyautey's imperial outlook. Lanessan developed three basic rules intended to guide colonial officials who intended on implementing more associationist policies.

> The first rule to be followed in the colonies is to respect absolutely the beliefs and religious practices of the natives..., the second rule which imposes itself upon modern

[24] Conklin, 11.
[25] Venier, 501-02.

> colonization follows from the first; it is necessary to respect the social institutions of the colonized…[,and] the third rule… consists of utilizing, whenever possible the indigenous administrative and political organization in the combined goal of diminishing expenses and winning the sympathies of the authorities and of the people[26]

These colonial guidelines served as the very foundation of Lyautey's native policy—one that was to be faithfully employed throughout his career.

From 1897 to1900, Lyautey sojourned in Paris. There, Lyautey awaited his transport to Madagascar, where he and his mentor, General Galleni, had been assigned following their stay in Tonkin. While in Paris, the up-and-coming *officier colonial* was invited to speak at a meeting of the *Voyageurs Français*, a group of notables who traveled throughout the French colonies, examining the status of the empire. As Lyautey later stated, this speech "was my first public profession of my colonial philosophy."[27]

There were three main arguments presented to the *Voyageurs*. First, Lyautey championed the concept that colonial officials could and should take on the dual role of administrator and soldier. Secondly, because more officials ought to be both fluent in military and governmental affairs, the number of administrators should decrease. Finally, Lyautey argued in a very persuasive and poetic manner that the colonies were absolutely necessary to ensure not only the survival, but the greater glory of France.

Within colonial circles, one of the most discussed questions that was continually raised concerning colonial administration was whether army officials or trained governmental officers should be the preferred choice for running the empire. Both skills,

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[26] Lanessan, 59-63.
[27] Hubert Louis Gonsalve Lyautey, "A la Réunion des Voyageurs Français" in Paroles d'Action: Madagascar, Sud-Oranais, Oran, Maroc, 1900-1926, (Paris: Librarie Armand Colin, 1927), 3.

martial and bureaucratic, were needed in the colonies, but all too often, the initiatives of the army and those of the governmental administrators clashed. As Lyautey himself explained:

> I dream of a mixed regime where these great chiefs could change their personnel indifferently according to the situation; taking a military man for one province, an administrator for an other, a doctor for a third, simply because they are the right man in the right place.
>
> But then, what do we have? It's anarchy![28]

Therefore, in order to run an efficient colony, the officials in charge must be able to act in a variety of roles rather than divide power among generals, bureaucrats, doctors, and others in specialized fields. The residents or governor-generals, the "great chiefs" of the colonies, must be both *soldats* and *administrateurs* if the colony was to run efficiently. In Lyautey's mind, men much akin to himself could fulfill such needs.

As a cause of this consolidation of powers and responsibilities under fewer men, there was no longer a need for so many high-ranking colonial officials. Lyautey contended that the presence of excess officials and generals not only rendered the colonial government less capable, but also drained precious funds that should instead be devoted to imperial projects: "In a word, this constant reduction of fresh generals keeps the budgets light and allows for the realization of the most beneficial outcomes."[29] According to Lyautey, the colonies (especially those recently added to the French fold) needed money for infrastructure, education, and defense programs. It was one thing to claim that France would lead the world in modernizing and "civilizing" Africa and Asia:

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[28] Ibid., 5.
[29] Ibid., 7.

Lyautey realized that such a mission, if it were to be successful, would be a very expensive endeavor. His idea of pulling funds away from colonial officers and toward the native peoples was essential to Lyautey's native policy later in Morocco. He believed that as long as the natives were benefiting economically under French guidance, French presence in the colonies would be accepted.[30]

Lanessan and Harmand would be proud. But, although Lyautey's suggestions for reforming colonial administration take up most of the address, it is the final paragraph of the speech where he most fully illustrates his imperialist philosophy.

> Gentlemen, you have all seen these family houses, several centuries old, of which it seems, one beautiful day, that the structure has been shaken to the foundations, and has usually become too constraining for the needs of future generations. Two choices present themselves: whether to raze the foundations to the soil and rebuild all the pieces, or better yet anchor the supports and annexes, which assures the solidity and meets the new needs, while keeping intact the old, traditional foyer.

The analogy continued:

> ...we are doing something similar by fortifying our old and dear France with new constructions; here a vast hall, there a modest bow-window, but they all, in their diversity, give air, assuring the expansion of new generations, all consolidating the old house, and all conserving religiously that which can and must be kept of the sacred foyer, which the fathers have inhabited and loved[31]

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[30] Georges Spillmann, Du protectorat à l'indépendence: Maroc, 1912-1955 (Paris: Plon, 1967), 21-26.
[31] Lyautey, "A la Réunion" in Paroles d'Action, 8-9.

These metaphors of the old house of France and the buttresses and "bow-windows" of the colonies represented Lyautey's conceptions of the empire. The colonies were not established simply for strategic and economic ends. On the contrary, the empire was created to be France's greatest social and cultural accomplishment.

But what could Lyautey have been referring to when he compared France to an old, grand house that had begun to weaken and crumble? France, at the turn of the century remained one of the preeminent powers in the world, possessing an empire that consumed about a third of the African continent. France had colonies and spheres of influence in every hemisphere and maintained a fairly stable and productive economy. Still, Lyautey characterized the nation as weakened and in need of support from the outside. In order to respond to why Lyautey and other Frenchmen lacked confidence in France's ability to sustain its position in the world, it is necessary to examine the domestic climate in which Lyautey pronounced his colonial views.

**Creation of the French Secular State:**

Third Republic France was continually rocked by internal struggles. Many groups within France challenged the very legitimacy of the Third Republic, a government that gained power as a result of its leaders' willingness to appease the Germans after 1871 and crush the Paris Commune. Moreover, the government was notoriously inefficient and infamous for its inability to promote economic growth comparable to that of Germany, Britain, and the United States. In many ways, just as the Ottoman Empire has been called the "sick man of Europe", the Third Republic can be seen as a sort of

"sick man of the French state". It was fraught with inactivity, and government shut downs were extremely common. One example that illustrates the weakness of the Third Republic was the debate that occurred in the legislature over implementation of income tax reform in 1895. Radicals, radical-socialists, bourgeois republicans, monarchists, and Catholic representatives were so divided on the issue that it dominated parliamentary debate to the point that no other major legislation was passed, and the government crawled to a standstill that lasted three months.[32]

Despite its apparent problems in approving tax legislation, the issue that dominated Third Republic politics from about 1890 to 1905 was fighting between Catholics and seculars. Even before the Dreyfus Affair, radical republicans had launched a sustained campaign to rid France of the Church's influence over the majority of its population. While the anti-clerical campaign carried some of the same rhetoric as its more well known 1791 Revolutionary predecessor, the republicans that wanted to cripple the power of the church never considered murdering priests or dechristianizing France.[33] However, the political and propagandic attack that secularist republicans launched against the Church was just as virulent at the turn of the nineteenth century.

In fact, the Church versus state issue was by far the foremost preoccupation of the Third Republic. Republicans regarded the Church as a great pneumatoscopic power; one entirely capable of ascertaining the loyalties of the masses, persuading the people to revolt against the republic. Secularists also believed that the Church and the "superstition" that was Catholicism represented the most prodigious obstacle that the

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[32] Jean-Marie Mayeur, La Vie Politique sous la Troisième Republique, 1870-1940 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1984), 165.

[33] Claude Langlois, "Catholics and Seculars" in Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past. ed. Pierre Nora, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, vol.3, (New York: Columbia University Press ,1998): 128-129.

Third Republic faced as it attempted to create a modernized nation-state. Catholics, on the other hand, were determined to maintain their social, cultural, and political status within France. The result of this in fighting was that little got done, and the National Assembly became an ideological forum in which Catholics and conservatives sat at one pole, and leftist anti-clerical republicans occupied the other.

Moderates were few and far between. In 1895, Jules Méline, a rare moderate republican attempted to create a centrist, coalition within the National Assembly. Méline believed that republican anti-clerical campaigns represented a radical tactic to instill fear in the urban electorate, the base of radical-socialist support. Méline himself could hardly have been considered to be pro-Catholic: parliamentary actions showed him to be quite anti-clerical. "Certainly, he had not renounced but affirmed the rights of the state as opposed to those of the Church." In fact, "he never questioned the laic laws."[34] However, in the eyes of those who made up the radical leadership—specifically Clemenceau, Léon Bourgeois, and Henri Brisson—Méline had not proceeded quickly enough in presenting legislation that would effectively and officially separate church and state. And so, his fragile coalition, under immense anti-clerical pressure, soon fell apart.[35]

The Republicans did, however, have limited success in passing legislation that helped to wrestle away social institutions that were traditionally under the auspices of the Church. This was certainly true of education where the Ferry Laws of the 1880's overturned the pro-parochial Falloux Laws of the 1850's. Beyond education, Catholics like Albert le Mun certainly had reason to feel that the secularization efforts of the state were working: public participation in the three major religious rites had been steadily

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[34] Mayeur, 166.
[35] Ibid.

declining for years. As the table below illustrates, the percentage of Parisians who went through the Church for funerals, christenings, and marriages fell dramatically from 1865 to 1905.

(Percentage of Parisian participation in Catholic religious rites, 1865-1905.)[36]

| | 1865 | 1885 | 1905 |
|---|---|---|---|
| funeral/burial | 90 | 75 | 73 |
| baptisms | 76? | 75 | 63 |
| marriages | 76 | 71 | 62 |

As one might imagine, Catholics in power did not stand by idly as the state continued to attack its privileges and institutions. Often referring to the republic as "*la gueuse*", or "that slut", Catholic and right-wing politicians were able to vote down numerous pieces of legislation that were anti-clerical. Catholics also turned to the press where journals such as the Assumptionist paper, *La Croix*, became the voice of Catholic discontent with the republic.[37]

As contemptuous and passionate as this war between Catholics and secularists was, there also existed the slight chance of compromise on issues that did not concern the elevation or decline of Catholic influence. Just prior to the elections of 1898, the Church began to divorce itself of the dream that France might revert back to monarchism. Unlike Pio Nono, Pope Leo XIII did not view republicanism and modernization as such inherent

[36] La Documentation Française, "Graphique 8", in Français, qui êtes-vous?: des essays et des chiffres, ed. Jean-Daniel Reynaud, Yves Grafmeyer, et Gérard Adam, (Paris: La Documentation française, 1981): 403.
[37] Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times: From the Enlightenment to the Present, 5th ed. (New York: Norton, 1995), 226-228.

evils. Thus, Leo XIII turned to a Catholic republican by the name of Étienne Lamy to create a Catholic political union. The union conceded that the republic was the legitimate government of France. The renewed Catholic political *ralliement*, as annunciated by Lamy, promised to pursue a "loyal acceptation of the constitutional terrain, but a reform of those laws which are contrary to the common rights of man and of liberty—the laws directed against Catholics, for such is necessary for those who want a regime of peace, embedded in liberty and justice."[38]

The chance for compromise ended with the conclusion of the Dreyfus Affair and Alfred Dreyfus' final exoneration.[39] From the beginning of *l'Affaire* in 1894 to about late 1897, it had been unclear as to whether or not Captain Dreyfus was actually guilty or innocent of treason. What had been abundantly clear were the positions that secular republicans and conservative Catholics took concerning the case. With the socialists under the leadership of Jean Jaurès, and radicals under Georges Clemenceau, the left professed Dreyfus' innocence and labeled the campaign against him to be a right-wing conspiracy. At the same time, the vast majority of monarchists and Catholics supported the military courts that convicted Dreyfus, and defended the integrity of the army. Parliamentary debate illustrates this division quite lucidly. On 22 January 1898, Jean Jaurès rose to speak in favor of the Dreyfusard cause and in defense of the republic. He was met with strong opposition from representatives of the right.

> Jaurès: [to Albert le Mun]… you and your friends always talk about the honor of the army and that the welfare of the army is your first and only concern…

[38] Étienne Lamy, qtd. in Mayeur, 171-72.
[39] Wright, 244. :"The general effect was to deepen existing divisions within France and to set back the growth of something like a national consensus."

> M. Savery de Beauregard: Yes, we respect the army and we love it!
>
> Jaurès: …there is again a much greater concern for you though; that is to save a government of reaction and privileges. (Loud applause from the extreme left)…

The speech went on after an interuption:

> Jaurès: The debacle [of the Affair] is the fault of the generals of the courts martial who are protected by the Empire, as well as the generals of the scheming nests of Jesuits who are still protected by this Republic! (Applause from the extreme left and several sections of the left. - Loud denouncements from the right.)[40]

The reaction against Jaurès' claims that both the army and the Jesuits were somehow responsible for the apparent scandal escalated to a fever pitch within the Chamber of Deputies. In fact, the Comte de Bernis actually stood up and accused Jaurès of being a member of the Jewish syndicate. Jaurès responded: "Monsieur Bernis, you are a miserable coward!" At that point, a certain M. Gérault-Richard walked across the hemi-circle and slapped Bernis. The pandemonium that resulted forced the president of the council to order the Chamber to adjourn.[41] Proceedings like those of 22nd of January were rather common throughout the final years of the Affair: the records of the proceedings of the National Assembly are littered with such incidents.[42]

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[40] Assemblé Nationale de France. Le Parlement et l'Affaire Dreyfus:1894-1906: Douze Années pour la Vérité. pref. Laurent Fabius, avant-propos. Bernard Derosier, (Paris: Assemblé Nationale, 1998), 71. *Henri Saverie de Beauregard (1862-1913), was an independent anti-Semite from the deux-Sèvres.

[41] Ibid., 73.

[42] Ibid., *See, for example, the debates over the Defense of the Republic measures by Charles Dupuy, Denys Cochin, and Albert le Mun, 194-203.

The floor of the legislature was not the only arena in which the left campaigned against the Church and the anti-Dreyfusards. The press was just as vital. Radicals and socialists combated *La Croix* and *La Libre Parole*[43] with their own journals and books. The most famous example of the power of the leftist media was Clemenceau's *L'Aurore*, which published Emile Zola's famous "*J'accuse*". In "*J'accuse*", Zola was careful not to openly condemn the army or the Church; this was an essay written to persuade, not enflame. However, "J'accuse" contained veiled attacks against the right, and interestingly, Zola dubbed the army General Staff, "that nest of Jesuits"[44]—a term, not coincidentally, that Jaurès would employ nine days later in front of the National Assembly. Besides his frequent speeches in front of Chamber of Deputies, Jaurès released his own book about the Dreyfus Affair in 1898. Entitled *Les Preuves* (The Proof), Jaurès professed Dreyfus' innocence, but also used the opportunity to assault the right. "One beautiful day," he wrote, it will be ascertained that the traitors, were allied with "Berlin and Rome…" On that day, there will be no more "shady activity behind closed doors," but "total justice."[45]

From the day that Dreyfus was exonerated to the beginning of the First World War, the left continually attacked traditional institutions like the army and the Church, and the right steadfastly defended them. Certainly, the ultimate importance of the Dreyfus Affair extends far beyond the parameters to which I have limited it here. The Affair represents the pinnacle of anti-Semitism in France and the height of French paranoia over

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[43] Michael Burns, France and the Dreyfus Affair: A Documentary History (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 1999), 8-9. **La Libre Parole* was the name of the intensely anti-Semitic newspaper run by Edouard Drumont.

[44] Emile Zola,. J'Accuse! Lettre au Président de la République: Emile Zola et l'Affaire Dreyfus, ed. Philippe Oriol, (Paris: EJL, 1998), 12.

[45] Jean Jaurès, Les Preuves: Affaire Dreyfus (Paris: La Petite République, 1898), 291.

German military superiority. However, the significance of the Dreyfus Affair as it pertains to this work, is that the Affair completely discredited the monarchists and Catholics who had supported the army. That is to say that, the republican secular state had finally delivered a death blow to monarchism, which would never again resurface as a viable threat to the republic, and severely wounded Catholic political power as France entered the twentieth century. In short, the Dreyfus Affair represented the greatest triumph of secularism within the Third Republic.

The left emerged as the predominant political power in France as a result of the Affair. As illustrated by parliamentary debate and Dreyfusard literature, the left possessed the uncanny ability to shrewdly link any defense of Dreyfus or Zola to a defense of the republic against the conspiratorial right. Thus, anti-clericals, both radicals and socialists, used the Dreyfus Affair as a sort of rallying point from which they discredited the right and gained support for their various agendas. The result was an overwhelming victory in 1902 for the *Bloc des gauches*-- a government coalition headed by the virulent anti-clerical, former seminarian, Emile Combes.

For all of the banter and harsh accusations made by former anti-clericals on the subject of the Church, Emile Combes made old republicans such as Ferry and Gambetta look like alter boys. Combes was proud to say that he, unlike his other secularist colleagues, knew the inner workings of the black, conspiring harem of the Church. With the ascendancy of Combes and the *Bloc des gauches*, it was incredibly clear to even the most passive political observer that secularization would be the top priority of the leftist coalition. As Judith Stone writes:

> The Combes government unquestionably advanced secularization as an essential element of republican culture and polity. Both inside and outside the Chamber of Deputies most supporters, and as many opponents of the *Bloc des gauches*, assumed that the anti-clerical issue was the first and most pressing of a series of reforms[46]

In fact, Combes had no qualms about making the Church/state issue the foremost occupation of his government. As he later wrote in his memoirs, "[o]ur unique preoccupation should be and was to safeguard our program."[47] To be sure, the anti-clerical issue made up only one of the socio-economic reforms that the *Bloc des gauches* wanted passed. But, the secular program was the only issue that did not intrinsically divide the leftist coalition. Socialists only deepened the ever-widening divisions between themselves, other radicals, and other republicans by continually pressing for more egalitarian economic reforms. The one thing that all of these groups could agree upon was that the time was right for the final break with the Church.

According to Combes, the Third Republic, throughout its history, was "a government assailed from all sides."[48] From its inception, monarchists, Catholics, Bonapartists, and Orléanists had attempted to undermine and attack its legitimacy. Other groups chimed in as well. Of course, the Communards despised the government, which they saw as a Bismarckian puppet. As the Republic advanced into the late 1890's and early days of the twentieth century, even more bizarre enemies took their shots at the government. In one of the more ironic events of the years leading up to the separation of 1905, Protestants, who witnessed the decline in political influence of the Catholic

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[46] Judith F. Stone, Sons of the Revolution, Radical Democrats in France, 1862-1914, (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1996), 267.
[47] Emile Combes, Ma Ministère: Mémoires, 1902-05. intro. Maurice Soire, (Paris: Plon, 1956), 266.
[48] Ibid., 254.

Church, appealed to the Combes government for privileges similar to those of the Catholics. They too metamorphosed into foes of the state when Combes refused accommodate them.[49]

Combes meant to rescue the beleaguered republic with the establishment of the official split between Church and state. The process continued for two years, but finally, in 1905, the French state overturned Napoleon's 1801-02 concordat with the Church. The final law, promulgated on the 9th of December, represented a devastating blow to the Church. It placed everything, from the schedule of public religious celebrations, to the ultimate control over ecclesial bell towers, under the power and discretion of the state. Furthermore, it ordered the suppression of all funds "of the state budget, the departments, the communes, and all that was to be dispensed to the exercise of the cults."[50] With the success and application of the separation laws, the Third Republic had finally eliminated the ability of the Church to exercise direct political power. Combes' *raison d'être* came into being; the triumph of the French secular state came to pass.

It is important to note republicans did not limit themselves to the exercise of legislative initiatives aimed at promoting secularism. The Third Republic followed a sustained program of reshaping France into the mold of a modern, secularist nation-state, one that continued unabated all the way up to 1914. Of particular interest to the government was the peasantry. As Eugen Weber has pointed out in his brilliant and exhaustive analysis, Peasants Into Frenchmen, the Third Republic was intent on bringing the peasantry into the purely French and secularist state. The government, in order to win the loyalties of peasants, inundated rural France with secularist institutions, whose

[49] Ibid., 250-251.
[50] Assemblée Nationale de France, "Loi sur la separation des églises et de l'état, 9 décembre 1905" in Les lois françaises de 1815 à 1914, ed. Léon Cahen et Albert Mathiez, (Paris: F. Alcan, 1927), 266-273.

mission was to pull the peasantry away from their dependence on the Church for education and social welfare programs. Furthermore, the Third Republic hoped to eradicate regionalism by turning Bretons, Provençals, and Auvergnats into Frenchmen. In many ways, this practice of consolidating the country mimicked French imperial practices of the 19th century that were intrinsically assimilationist.[51] However, the modernization of the countryside of France undertaken by the Third Republic did not entirely resemble French imperialist practices in Morocco. But the legacy of the Dreyfus Affair and the secularization of France determined that the French state would exercise ultimate power and exist as the overarching state power apparatus, not only in France proper, but in her new protectorate as well.

**Morocco and the Protectorate:**

All of this turmoil—the reform of the empire, the Dreyfus Affair, and the separation of church and state—contributed to the creation of nothing short of a new French imperialism. As mentioned earlier, associationism became the official policy of the empire in 1895. Within a decade, French imperialist reformers had achieved their intended goal of initiating a radical alteration of the French imperial mission. As a cause of the call for reforms of the imperial system led by Lanessan, colonial officials, such as Ernest Roume and William Ponty in French West Africa, implemented a series of social colonial reforms based on associationism.[52] It would be erroneous, however, to conclude

[51]Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976) *For his discussion on the modernization of the countryside and how it relates to France's imperial mission, see pages 485-496.
[52]Conklin, 73-75, 107-111.

that these reforms represented the only facet of the new French imperialism to be employed in Morocco in 1912. It was the successful switch from assimilationism to associationism, coupled with the overwhelming triumph of the French secular state after the Dreyfus Affair and the separation laws, that dictated the sort of imperial initiative that was wholly characteristic of the earliest years of France's domination over Morocco. That is to say that, the imperialist cause in Morocco would and did consist of French attempts to modernize Morocco's economy, build cultural and social bonds, and work with indigenous institutions in order to govern the protectorate, but it also consisted of an innate desire on the part of the French government to take on the ultimate role of secular state within their new protectorate.

The French were incredibly determined to implement their new form of imperialism and see their final colonial venture produce fruit. As Daniel Rivet states, the Third Republic believed that Morocco "constituted the last occasion to augment [France's] field of imperial experimentation in a world so divided into enclosed colonial domains and reserved spheres of influence."[53] Accordingly, it seemed as though French determination to gain Morocco knew no bounds. In order to finally gain something of a free hand in Morocco, the Third Republic conceded any influence that the French might have in Egypt to the British and recognized British rights in Siam that same year.[54] The Third Republic went on to recognize the Spanish claims to a significant portion of Northern Morocco during a secret convention in Paris in 1904.[55] But, it was the Germans who demanded the most from France. Whether the Kaiser was truly interested in

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[53] Rivet, 22.
[54] Assemblée Nationale de France, "Déclaration de Londres relative à l'Egypte et au Maroc, [et] Déclaration relative au Siam, 8 avril 1904" in Les lois françaises, 330-334.
[55] Idem, "Convention secrèt de Paris" in Les lois françaises, 335-337.

rendering Morocco into a German colony, or knew that he could milk the French for whatever he wanted, remains unclear. But, the Third Republic certainly perceived William II's diplomatic visit to Morocco in 1911 as an unveiled desire to get his hands on what Paris considered to be rightfully property of France. Morocco began to take on a new dimension for the French, as it became the Alsace-Lorraine of North Africa. Tensions further escalated when the German gunboat, *Panther*, took harbor in Agadir in 1911.[56] Finally, French minister Joseph Caillaux secretly struck a deal with Berlin that was later approved by the National Assembly. He authored a treaty ceding an enormous area of the French Congo to Germany in exchange for official German recognition of France's right to "lend assistance to the Moroccan government for the introduction of all reforms."[57]

While these significant concessions to the European imperial powers illustrated the magnitude of Paris' desire to add Morocco to the empire, the Treaty of Fez, signed with the Sultan in 1912, foreshadowed the implementation of France's new brand of imperialism in Morocco. The first stipulation within the treaty reads:

> [The French] regime will safeguard the religious situation, the respect and the national prestige of the Sultan, the religious exercise of the Islamic faith and its religious institutions…[and] it will guide and support the organization of a reformed Cherifien Makhzen[58]

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[56] Moha, 63-64.

[57] Assemblée Nationale de France, "Convention de Berlin relative au Maroc, 4 novembre 1911" in Les lois françaises, 342-345. *The land ceded to Germany constituted what are present day Cameroon and Togo.

[58] Idem, "Traité de Fez, 30 mars 1912" in Les lois françaises, 345-346. *The Makhzen were traditional, local Islamic assemblies responsible for local government under the Sultan.

Implicit within this stipulation is that the French would not only defend the state religion, but facilitate the local Muslim councils (Makhzen) in their efforts to administer to the population.

At first glance, the Treaty of Fez seems to support my contention that associationism was central to the Franco-Moroccan experience, and yet debunk my argument that French secularism had a profound effect on the type of imperialism to be applied within Morocco. Indeed, why would a hardened, callous secularist regime like the Third Republic ever advocate and protect the practice of a religion that might limit public obedience to the state? It appears extremely odd that a government that had just relinquished the bonds of clericalism would, just seven years later, allow even a semblance of theocracy in one of its colonies. Moreover, the French promised to "respect the national prestige of the Sultan," a theocratic monarch! If anything, the Treaty of Fez seemed absent of any French desires to secularize Morocco. Even in the other stipulations of the agreement, where the Third Republic declared its rights over the economic, military, and foreign affairs of Morocco, it did so in the name of and under the authority of the Sultan.[59]

Did these French concessions to the fundamental powers of the Sultan and the Makhzen really resemble a mollification or even absence of the application of French secularism in Morocco? In order to answer this, it is necessary to reconsider the actual make up of the modern French secular nation-state that emerged from the Dreyfus Affair and the separation laws. Victorious, the Third Republic hoped to encourage secularism, not only within France proper, but the empire as well. In 1905, the Third Republic successfully detached itself from its formal union with the Church, but with its divorce

[59] Ibid.

from Catholicism, the Third Republic necessarily rendered itself an irreligious state. In other words, the powers granted to the government were similar to the role that the French state played in the Moroccan protectorate. The exact powers granted to France by the treaty with the Sultan represented the responsibilities of a purely secular state, and the republicans of the Third Republic believed themselves to be the champions of secularism. In Morocco, the Sultan and the Makhzen represented already established tools by which this secular state could be more effectively implemented.

The choice of Hubert Lyautey as first resident-general of Morocco provides further evidence of the intent behind the Third Republic's Moroccan policy. Through Lyautey, the French tried to reconcile their own brand of secularism with their freshly developed philosophy of associationism. French officials had been well aware of Lyautey's colonial philosophies when he was chosen as the new head of the protectorate, for since his adoption of Lanessan's theories of associationism back in Tonkin, Lyautey continuously preached the strengths of associationism to groups like the *Voyageurs Français*. In addition, Lyautey stubbornly sought to implement associationist policies in his other colonial stops in Madagascar and the Western frontier of Algeria. His adherence to the policy of association, combined with his eventual pacification of both areas, won Lyautey the general support of the National Assembly. Among his supporters was, rather surprisingly, the Tiger, Georges Clemenceau. Since about 1905, Clemenceau had begun to soften his anti-colonial stance, especially due to the fact that Germany had entered the colonial arena as an imposing rival.[60] In addition to wanting to contain German colonial

[60] Raymond Poincaré, Au service de la France: neuf années de souvenirs, le lendemain d'Agadir. Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1926) 66-67. * Poincaré reports that Clemenceau was adamant about not backing down from the Germans concerning Morocco. According to Poincaré, Clemenceau declared: "We are pacifists—

expansion, Clemenceau bought into Lyautey's strategy of association and considered it to be the only proper way in which to administer to the new addition to the empire. In fact, it was Clemenceau who elected to send Lyautey to pacify Morocco early in 1912. As Pierre Guiral writes: "If [Clemenceau] did not appreciate the French penetration into Morocco, he certainly did not stop it, but even accelerated it while he was Council president."[61] Meanwhile, the socialists, under the leadership of Alexandre Millerand, Léon Bourgeois, and Aristide Briand, echoed Clemenceau's sentiments and urged President Raymond Poincaré to carry out the immediate and complete military occupation of Morocco. Millerand himself helped Poincaré choose General Lyautey as the first resident-general. Concerning the nomination of Lyautey, Poincaré commented that Lyautey "had seduced me by the vivacity of his intelligence and by his sympathetic understanding of the soul of the Musulman."[62] Poincaré had considered naming another senior official in Morocco, General Regnault, to the residency, but in his mind, Regnault "was too profoundly attached to the old politics in Tangiers"—an adherence to a form of direct administration that rendered Regnault unsuitable for "a new regime" in Morocco.[63] The Third Republic—radical, socialist, and moderate—was squarely behind Lyautey and his mission to implement France's new imperialism.

Despite passing though what Lyautey called the "hot days" of his residency,[64] Lyautey never lost his devotion to his imperial philosophies. Although he and his army were attacked in Fez, and although he had to send young Frenchmen home in caskets as a

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pacific is the exact word—but we are not submissive... We do not concede to the surrender and forfeiture pronounced by our neighbors. We have attained a great history, and we intend to preserve it."

[61] Guiral, 84-85.

[62] Poincaré, 98.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Lyautey, "Lettre à André Lazard, Fez le 22 juin 1912", in Un Lyautey Inconnu: Correspondence et Journal Inedits, 1874-1934. ed. André le Révérand, (Avignon: Librarie Academique Perrin, 1980) 259-60.

result of the pacification, Lyautey only became increasingly convinced that associationism was right for the protectorate. He maintained that only by strictly adhering to his agenda could he mold Morocco into the type of protectorate that the Third Republic so desired. "Despite all of the difficulties", he wrote, "I have the utmost confidence in the result".[65] According to the resident-general, this was possible because most of the Moroccans were not opposed to the protectorate. The insurrections, Lyautey claimed, were not a result of the signing of the Treaty of Fez and the abdication of Sultan Moulay Hafid, but were caused by the religious fanaticism of a minority of local leaders. In his own classic style, Lyautey described the situation:

> This country, like the most perilous seas for navigation, is full of cyclones... because the deep causes [of the violence] still exist: they are religious fanaticism, the attachment to the oldest form of Islam, the fierce cult of independence, the practice of anarchy, and xenophobia[66]

Certainly, the republicans in National Assembly could sympathize with Lyautey, but many were growing tired of reading about French regiments being attacked in the protectorate. Several months passed and the French still had not established control over much of the interior. Undaunted by critics back home who claimed that Lyautey's Moroccan experiment had failed,[67] the general continued to push for the rapid economic development and the reestablishment of order.

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[65] Idem, "Lettre au Comte Albert le Mun, Rabat, le 29 juillet 1912" in Choix de Lettres, 1882-1919 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1947), 294-95.
[66] Idem., "À Rabat, le 20 octobre 1912", in Paroles, 73-74.
[67] Robert de Caix, "L'oeuvre française au Maroc", Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française et du Comité du Maroc, no. 7, (juillet 1912): 249-70. *De Caix argued that Lyautey's insistence on involving the corrupt Makhzen in administrative affairs, as well as the general's inability to suppress the anti-French rebellion called for a reassessment of the Third Republic's approach in Morocco. De Caix advocated the creation of three zones in Morocco: one to be completely under the governance of the Islamic authorities,

> I readily anticipate the complete and rapid deployment of all of our economic works: ports, roads, railroads, and beside them, the civilizing works: schools and cultural exchanges, which are sure to have a quick influence on the indigenous people. All that will develop commerce will be the greatest aide to our military mission that we have to complete[68]

The fighting continued for the next two years, but Lyautey maintained his optimism and relentlessly sought to implement economic, social, and political reforms within Morocco. Using his ship metaphor once again, he wrote: "It is only after going through the tempest that the ship, as strong as it is, shows that it is worthy and increases the feeling of security among its passengers."[69] In order to deliver the protectorate out of the storm, he pushed Paris for more funding for infrastructure. Despite the government's displeasure with Lyautey's inability to quickly subdue the rebellion, the Third Republic approved a massive loan to fund the general's program in 1914. In all, the French promised 170.25 million francs, a substantial amount of the colonial budget, which was to be solely devoted to the protectorate. Exactly what the funds were devoted to sheds more light on the untrammeled commitment that the Third Republic had in seeing the protectorate succeed. The loan did not only provide money to programs to make Morocco more economically viable to the French, but allotted significant amounts to social and cultural programs intended to enhance the daily life of the inhabitants. Twenty

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the second to be administered in the proscribed Lyautey style, and the third to be directly governed by the French.
Rivet, 22-23. *Daniel Rivet writes that Raymond Poincaré became increasingly frustrated by Lyautey's continual demands for more reinforcements to subdue the scattered rebellions, insurrections that Lyautey promised the president that he could quickly extinguish.
[68] Lyautey, "À Rabat", in Paroles, 74.
[69] Lyautey, Paroles, 66.

**Conclusion:**

In May 1921, the French notable, scholar and world traveler Max LeClerc visited Morocco. He had been a great admirer of Marshal Lyautey and his imperial policies and wanted to see first-hand how associationism had been applied nine years after the establishment of the protectorate. LeClerc was not disappointed—in fact, throughout his written account of his experience, he never critiqued Lyautey, who the author often portrayed as an almost Alexandrian figure—Lyautey being one who traveled throughout the world spreading the fruits of civilization, from Indochina, to Madagascar, and finally to Morocco. According to LeClerc, Lyautey was "not only the Chief of State who knows all the affairs of state at a glance, he is also the animator of men and things throughout his Empire."[75]

Despite this tendency to canonize Lyautey within the French *monde coloniale*, LeClerc, in his less hyperbolic statements concerning Lyautey's residency, provides evidence that the French imperialistic design for Morocco had begun to come to fruition by the early 1920's. LeClerc comments in his more benign, but pertinent chapters, on the concrete ways in which the French actualized their new imperialism.

> All of the official buildings have been constructed in a very pleasing style as a result of a skillful adaptation of Arabic modes for modern needs... These official structures are not reconstructed in the Algerian mode, with white terraces, but built with roofs of green tiles for a more agreeable effect[76]

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[75]Max LeClerc, Au Maroc Avec Lyautey (Paris: Librarie Armand Colin, 1927), 98.
[76] Ibid., 13-14.

The French were not only concerned with the architectural congruity of official buildings with those of the Moroccan cities. In keeping with the spirit of economic associationism, by 1921, the French had managed to construct a lengthy network of roads linking the countryside to the cities and coast. Commenting on a road leading to Rabat, LeClerc wrote that it was, "constantly in use, full of traffic with heavy cargoes. There is an intense flow of cars and trucks used by as many natives as colons."[77] In LeClerc's mind, Lyautey was successfully implementing associationism and was thereby resurrecting the French imperialist cause—Morocco represented the best of what the metropole had to offer to the empire. Both nations benefited from the protectorate. That is to say that the associationist policy in Morocco "was conceived for the governance of a people with a rich past and future,"[78] French and Moroccan alike.

However, associationism was never fully put into practice within Morocco. Despite the French ability to incorporate Islamic motifs in new architecture, and the success of rendering Morocco economically modern and viable, French associationism failed when it came to what LeClerc called "the governance of a people with a rich past and future."

The problem with the implementation of the new French imperialism within Morocco was that the traditional institutions of the Moroccan state—the Sultan and the Makhzen—were not just local or religious authorities; they possessed intrinsic secular powers as well. In the end though, the weakening of the local government in Morocco was not a result of a lessening of support and encouragement from Lyautey and the French, or their abandonment of associationist policies. The Makhzen's slow death can

[77] Ibid., 23.
[78] Ibid., 25.

be attributed to the fact that Lyautey was forced to continuously confront the dilemma of supporting the traditional institutions of Moroccan governance while concurrently establishing the French state as the overarching secular apparatus of the protectorate. All too often, it became eminently clear to the Moroccans that the French state won out. But, French devotion to associationism did not waver. For the French, it was necessary to maintain and uphold the power of the native administrative institutions, but the unmitigated aspiration of the French to install themselves as the secular alternative produced an inherent conflict that could never be resolved.

In the end, the construction of the French state as secular and the preservation of indigenous Moroccan institutions as cultural and religious produced a natural incompatibility, for the native institutions were both religious and governing authorities. But, regardless of the awkwardness of this system, the French had to find out if their new imperial program could work. The French gave up Cameroon, they gave up security at home, they spent hundreds of millions of francs, and they sacrificed their own young men to see if a modern secular nation-state could cooperate with colonial, indigenous institutions in a peaceful and efficacious manner, for the benefit of both nations. The French Third Republic, throughout the early years of both its seizure and establishment of the Moroccan protectorate, was trying to reconcile itself with its imperial past. This aspiration was never to be realized in Morocco.

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